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Enforcing the Charter: The
Supervisory Role of Superior Courts
and the Responsibility of
Legislatures for Remedial Systems
Marilyn L. Pilkington*

I. INTRODUCTION
Let us consider what a Canadian superior court will do if faced with
a recalcitrant government which declines to respect constitutional rights
in its delivery of programs and services. We know that, in appropriate
circumstances, the Supreme Court of Canada is prepared to read words
into legislation to correct an infringement of constitutional rights,
thereby displacing legislative powers. Will it authorize superior court
judges to take on a supervisory role where a government administers its
programs in a manner that infringes constitutional rights? Federal court
judges in the United States have taken on such a role. Should Canadian
judges be more cautious in doing so? Is there something about executive
or administrative powers that entitles them to more deference than is
due to legislation? Is there something about the relationship of legislatures and courts in Canada that differs from that in the United States?
In its recent decision in Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister
of Education),1 the Supreme Court of Canada provided its initial perspective on issues that will occupy courts in the exercise of supervisory
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Associate Professor and former Dean, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, with the able research assistance and contributions of Christopher Crawford-Dickinson,
candidate for the LL.B. and Ph.D. (Political Science) degrees at York University.
1
[2003] 3 S.C.R. 3, [2003] S.C.J. No. 63, on appeal from the Nova Scotia Court of
Appeal (2001), 194 N.S.R. (2d) 323, [2001] N.S.J. No. 240 (C.A.), (Flinn J.A. for the majority, Freeman J.A. dissenting); on appeal from the order of LeBlanc J. of the Supreme Court of
Nova Scotia (2000), 185 N.S.R. (2d) 246 (S.C.) [hereinafter “Doucet-Boudreau”].
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remedies for constitutional infringement. The majority judges2 asserted
that the appropriateness of supervisory remedies does not arise in this
case, and assessed the remedy at issue in pragmatic terms, reflecting a
willingness to tailor remedial powers as needed to provide effective
enforcement of rights. The dissenting judges,3 however, were intent on
erecting guardrails, and maybe roadblocks, on what they perceived to be
the slippery slope of inappropriate judicial intervention in government
administration. Even the dissenters concluded that supervisory remedies
will be appropriate where other remedies have failed, and thus the Court
unanimously affirmed the availability of supervisory remedies. What
separated the majority judges and those in dissent appears to be a matter
of degree — should supervisory remedies be available only as a matter
of last resort, or should they constitute one of the choices among several
options for remedying constitutional infringements? I will review their
reasons and the factors they would consider in determining when supervisory remedies are appropriate.
Whether or not there is a hierarchy of remedies, it is evident that
courts and tribunals with power to decide Charter issues will not be able
to fulfill the purpose of section 24(1)4 of the Charter unless they have
the capacity to tailor the remedy to the right and to the infringement. In
Doucet-Boudreau the majority judges held that superior court judges
have broad jurisdiction and discretion to select from the full range of
appropriate and just remedies for Charter infringements, and that this
jurisdiction cannot be limited by statute or common law. Accordingly,
there will always be at least one court to which a claimant can resort to
seek a remedy for a constitutional wrong. Nonetheless, the majority
judges join with the dissenting judges in citing with approval earlier
decisions of the Court that limit the broad language of section 24(1) by
confining the constitutional jurisdiction of statutory and inferior courts

2
The majority reasons are written jointly by Iacobucci and Arbour JJ., concurred in
by McLachlin C.J., Gonthier and Bastarache JJ.
3
The dissenting reasons are written jointly by LeBel and Deschamps JJ., concurred in
by Major and Binnie JJ.
4
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, s. 24(1):
Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed
or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the
court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances.
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and tribunals within their ordinary jurisdiction. I will argue that constitutional provisions should not be subordinated to the jurisdictional and
procedural systems that were in place before the Charter was adopted;
that courts are not able to revise these systems on a case-by-case basis;
and that Parliament and legislatures have a constitutional responsibility
to review and amend statutory jurisdiction and procedure to give effect
to the broad remedial jurisdiction conferred in section 24(1). Since the
enforcement of constitutional rights and freedoms depends on private
prosecution, it is important that claimants who establish an unjustified
infringement be entitled to an appropriate and just remedy. The entitlement should not be deflected by unnecessary jurisdictional and procedural hurdles, multiplicity of proceedings, potentially conflicting results,
and attendant costs.
The majority decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in DoucetBoudreau v. Nova Scotia indicates that the Court will continue to be
cautious in developing appropriate and just remedies for constitutional
wrongs under section 24(1) of the Charter, but that the majority is prepared to be flexible and pragmatic, to assess the appropriateness of a
remedy in the context of the right and the nature of the infringement,
and to respect the trial judge’s exercise of discretionary judgment. It is
difficult to predict whether the majority position will hold. Both of the
co-authors of the majority position will soon retire from the Court, and
new appointments could shift the balance toward the dissenting judges’
narrower view of the court’s role. The dissenting reasons, supported by
four members of the Court, are argued in strong, even adversarial,
terms, espousing a commitment to a constitutional doctrine of separation
of powers that supports judicial restraint in the supervision of executive
action.
In this paper, I will consider the reasons of the Supreme Court of
Canada in Doucet- Boudreau v. Nova Scotia, the circumstances in which
judicial supervision of government programs will constitute the appropriate and just remedy for constitutional infringement, and the responsibility of Parliament and the legislatures to review established
jurisdictional and procedural systems to ensure that they provide effective frameworks for developing and enforcing remedies pursuant to
section 24(1) of the Charter.
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II. THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA IN
DOUCET-BOUDREAU V. NOVA SCOTIA
1. The Issues in Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia
Sixteen years after minority language education rights were guaranteed in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, francophone parents applied to the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia for an order directing the
province of Nova Scotia and the Conseil Scolaire Acadien to fund and
provide facilities and programs in the French language at the secondary
level. The provincial government did not dispute the parents’ rights or
their entitlement to facilities and programs, but delayed in complying
with its obligations despite clear indications that assimilation was undercutting the constitutional entitlement. The trial judge ordered the
province and the Conseil to provide the facilities and programs, and to
use their best efforts to meet specified deadlines. In addition, he retained
jurisdiction to hear progress reports. The nature and manner of the reports and the procedure for dealing with them were not explicitly defined in the initial order, but were clarified as the hearings proceeded.
By majority decision, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal held that the
retention of jurisdiction and reporting requirements exceeded the trial
judge’s jurisdiction under section 24(1) of the Charter. The dissenting
judges in the Supreme Court of Canada would have upheld this result,
on the basis that the trial judge’s order failed to meet standards of procedural fairness, breached the functus officio doctrine, and exceeded the
proper role of the judiciary. The majority judges upheld the remedy on
the basis that it was effective to vindicate the rights of the claimants and
employed remedial techniques appropriate to the judicial role.
2. Unanimous Support for Effective and Imaginative Charter
Remedies
At the outset, it is important to note that, although the dissenting
judges rejected the appropriateness of the reporting remedy ordered
by the trial judge, they did confirm their support for “effectively enforcing constitutional rights”5 and recognized “the need for efficacy and
5

Doucet-Boudreau, supra, note 1, at para. 91 [S.C.R.].
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imagination in the development of constitutional remedies.”6 In addition, they acknowledged that “superior courts’ powers to craft Charter
remedies may not be constrained by statutory or common law limits.”7
They set out alternative means by which, in their view, the Court could
have appropriately achieved its remedial objective in the DoucetBoudreau case.8 Furthermore, they recognized that “in the appropriate
factual circumstances, injunctive relief may become necessary”9 and
may be appropriate “where it is the only way that a claimant’s rights can
be vindicated.”10 The dissenters also affirm that
[courts] must be assertive in enforcing constitutional rights. At times,
they have to grant such relief as will be required to safeguard basic
constitutional rights and the rule of law, despite the sensitivity of
certain issues or circumstances and the reverberations of their
decisions in their societal environment.11

Accordingly, the objections of the dissenters to supervisory remedies are not absolute, but are objections of degree. In the dissenters’
view, the supervisory remedy is one of last resort. They asserted that,
unless it is established that the executive defies a directly applicable
judicial order, “increased judicial intervention in public administration
will rarely be appropriate,”12 and, further, that “[c]ourts should not unduly encroach on areas which should remain the responsibility of public
administration and should avoid turning themselves into managers of
the public service.”13 Accordingly, despite some general statements to
the contrary,14 it appears that the dissenters did contemplate circumstances in which a superior court will properly order supervisory remedies in order to enforce constitutional rights.
The majority judges asserted the importance of a purposive approach to the interpretation of remedies provisions, requiring that the
6

Id., at para. 94.
Id., at para. 105.
8
Id., at para. 142.
9
Id., at para. 134.
10
Id., at para. 135.
11
Id., at para. 106.
12
Id., at para. 140.
13
Id., at para. 91.
14
See, for example, statements, id., at paras. 117 and 120, referred to infra, in the text
at notes 28 and 35.
7
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remedy be responsive to the right and effective to vindicate the right.
They affirmed earlier decisions of the Court that the remedies provision
must be “construed generously,”15 to provide effective, responsive
remedies that guarantee full, effective and meaningful remedy for Charter violations since “a right, no matter how expansive in theory, is only
as meaningful as the remedy provided for its breach.”16 The majority
charged the dissenting judges with “severely undervalu[ing] the importance and the urgency of the language rights in the context [of this
case].”17 They focused on the impact of government delay in complying
with clear obligations under section 23 of the Charter, which itself was
designed to correct past injustices.18 The majority emphasized the critical need for timely compliance with minority language education rights
since delay leads to assimilation and erosion of the numbers that warrant
the right. In the view of the majority, the case presented circumstances
of necessity and urgency that justify affirmative remedies.
3. Different Views on the Appropriate Role of the Judiciary
In defining limits on a superior court’s remedial powers, the dissenters held that a remedy under section 24(1) will not be appropriate
and just unless it has “the requisite legitimacy and certainty.”19 In their
view, the reporting remedy in Doucet-Boudreau failed to comply with
section 24(1) because it failed to meet standards of procedural fairness
and exceeded the appropriate role of the judiciary.
(a) Procedural Fairness
The dissenters considered that the reporting order was seriously
flawed in that it failed to provide clear notice of the obligations of the
parties. They chided the trial judge for failing to observe “basic rules of
15

Supra, note 1, at para. 24 [S.C.R.], citing McLachlin C.J., for the Court, in R. v.
974649 Ontario Inc., [2001] 3 S.C.R. 75, at para. 18, [2001] S.C.J. No. 79 [hereinafter
“Dunedin Construction”].
16
Doucet-Boudreau, id., at para. 25, quoting McLachlin C.J. in “Dunedin Construction,” supra, note 15, at paras. 19-20.
17
Doucet-Boudreau, id., at para. 23.
18
Id., at paras. 26-28.
19
Id., at para. 147.
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legal writing,”20 “canons of good legal drafting,”21 and the fundamental
importance of procedural fairness.22 They asserted that the remedial
order failed to specify the form and content of the required reports and
the procedure, purpose, and nature of reporting hearings. Without identifying any actual prejudice to the responding province resulting from the
lack of definition, the dissenting judges concluded that the reporting
order breached the parties’ interest in procedural fairness and was inappropriate and void on that basis alone.
The majority judges acknowledged that “future orders of this type
could be more explicit and detailed with respect to the ... procedure at
reporting hearings,”23 but concluded that the order was not “incomprehensible, ... impossible to follow ... [or] unclear in a way that would
render it invalid.”24 They noted that, while there was some uncertainty
in the procedure to be followed, matters were clarified as they proceeded, and the process, together with the guidance of appellate courts,
will be instructive to counsel and judges in future cases.
(b) The Role of the Judiciary in Remedying Government Inaction
The dissenting judges considered that the trial judge breached the
common law principle of functus officio, as well as a constitutional
principle of separation of powers, by retaining jurisdiction to order the
province to make progress reports and thereby encroached on the executive’s responsibility for public administration. The majority judges rejected this approach, holding that the court’s constitutionally defined
remedial role is not restricted by concepts of judicial restraint, or by
principles derived from statutory or common law. Rather, the court’s
remedial role is to be determined on the basis of what remedy is appropriate and just to vindicate the infringement of a constitutional right.

20
21
22
23
24

Id., at para. 91.
Id., at para. 94.
Id., at paras. 97-104.
Id., at para. 84.
Id., at para. 83.
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(i) Retaining Jurisdiction and the Doctrine of Functus Officio

The dissenting judges relied on the doctrine of functus officio to
conclude that the trial judge could not retain jurisdiction to hear reports
on the province’s progress toward compliance with the terms of his
order. They asserted the need for finality of decisions in order to facilitate appeals. The majority judges rejected the primacy of the functus
officio argument in that a common law principle cannot limit the broad
grant of remedial jurisdiction in section 24(1).25 The majority recognized that the policy reflected in the principle may be relevant in determining whether the trial judge’s remedial order was appropriate. The
majority concluded, however, that the functus officio doctrine did not
apply in that instance since the trial judge did not retain power to alter
his disposition of the case. He had made a final disposition with respect
to the scope of section 23, the finding of infringement, and the action to
be taken by the province by way of remedy, and thus provided a stable
basis for appeal.26 The majority concluded that, having come to a final
disposition, the trial judge acted appropriately in including, as part of his
order, the requirement of progress reports: “[t]he change announced by
s. 24 of the Charter is that the flexibility inherent in an equitable remedial jurisdiction may be applied to orders addressed to government to
vindicate constitutionally entrenched rights.”27
(ii) Separation of Powers

The dissenting members of the Court considered that
if a court intervenes ... in matters of administration properly entrusted
to the executive, it exceeds its proper sphere and thereby breaches the
separation of powers. By crossing the boundary between judicial acts
and administrative oversight, it acts illegitimately and without
jurisdiction. Such a crossing of the boundary cannot be characterized
as relief that is “appropriate and just in the circumstances” within the
meaning of s. 24(1) of the Charter.28

25
26
27
28

Id., at para. 75.
Id., at paras. 79-80.
Id., at para. 73.
Id., at para. 117.
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Thus, the dissenting judges appear to negate any possibility of superior courts issuing remedies that require supervision of executive action.
The language is inconsistent with their acknowledgment, noted above,29
that supervisory remedies may be appropriate in some cases. There also
appears to be a contradiction in the fact that the dissenting judges considered it appropriate for courts to intrude on the executive function to
the extent of ordering the provision of facilities and programs in accordance with a specified timetable, but unacceptable to require the government to report on its progress in doing so, even in the face of a
history of delay in fulfilling its well-defined constitutional responsibility.
The dissenters relied on the separation of powers which, they alleged, is now “entrenched as a cornerstone of our constitutional regime.”30 However, it is not entirely clear what this separation of powers
entails. For instance, later in the reasons, the dissenting judges referred
to the “balance that has been struck between our three branches of government”31 but still later, they referred to the fact that “in [Canada], the
executive is inextricably tied to the legislative branch.”32
These statements contradict each other and the assertion of a doctrine of separation of powers is inconsistent with Canada’s historical,
legal, and political organization. As stated in the Preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867,33 Canada’s Constitution is similar in principle to that of
the United Kingdom, and thus predicated on a fusion of executive and
legislative powers with an independent judiciary. In asserting a strict
separation of powers between executive, legislative, and judicial
branches of government, the dissenters are appropriating a concept
based on the American constitution and using it to limit the scope of
judicial remedies, as advocated by some Charter critics who argue that
courts are usurping government’s ability to govern.34
To the dissenting judges, judicial supervision of governmental functions breaches the principle of separation of powers in three ways. First,
the court acts beyond its capacities since the judiciary is “ill equipped to
29

See the text at notes 6-11.
Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), supra, note 1, at para. 107.
31
Id., at para. 111.
32
Id., at para. 123.
33
(U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 50.
34
See, for example, Morton & Knopff, The Charter Revolution and The Court Party
(2000), at 153.
30
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make polycentric choices or to evaluate the wide-ranging consequences
that flow from policy implementation.”35 Accordingly, as in Eldridge v.
British Columbia (Attorney General),36 the court should recognize that it
is up to government to choose from among the various options to rectify
the constitutional infringement.37
Second, the dissenting judges asserted that the supervisory remedies
infringe the separation of powers by undermining the co-operation and
mutual respect that characterizes the relationships between branches of
government in Canada.38 They referred to the well-established requirement that legislatures and governments respect the independence and
impartiality of the judiciary39 and turned the proposition around to argue
that courts should avoid, as a general rule, interfering in the management of public administration except as necessary to supervise administrative tribunals, and guard constitutional rights and the rule of law.40 In
fact, however, the independence of courts from the legislative and executive branches is based on their need to be independent and impartial
in order to meet the requirements of the rule of law. By contrast, the
legislative and executive branches are subject to judicial review. Judicial
intrusion in the work of the legislative and executive branches is implicitly required in our constitutional arrangements and explicitly authorized
by section 24(1) of the Charter. Thus, a constitutional doctrine of the
separation of powers does not provide a basis for distinguishing between
acceptable and unacceptable judicial intervention. When the court decides an issue of constitutional entitlement and enforcement, as between
a claimant and the state, the court must be even-handed in determining
the appropriate and just remedy. It should not defer to government on
the basis of an obligation of mutual co-operation and respect that prevails over the claimants’ constitutional entitlement.
Third, the dissenting judges asserted that, by requiring government
to report, the trial judge exerted political pressure on government and
thereby infringed the separation of powers. The dissenters concluded that,
since courts are entitled to protection from political pressure exercised by
35
36
37
38
39
40

Doucet-Boudreau, supra, note 1, at para. 120. See also para. 124.
[1997] 3 S.C.R. 624, at para. 96, [1997] S.C.J. No. 86.
Doucet-Boudreau, supra, note 1, at para. 124.
Id., at para. 121.
Id., at para 109.
Id., at para. 110.
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government, government should also be protected from political pressure exerted by courts.41 By characterizing measures to ensure timely
compliance with Charter rights as the application of political pressure,
the dissenting judges called into question the fundamental capacity of
courts to enforce Charter guarantees in any circumstances.
As the majority judges recognized, there are limits on the degree to
which it is appropriate for courts to micro-manage the means by which
governments comply with Charter remedies. These appropriate limits
are not determined by a doctrine of separation of powers, but rather are
based on the respective institutional capacities of courts and governments: “in the context of constitutional remedies, courts must be sensitive to their role as judicial arbiter and not fashion remedies which usurp
the role of the other branches of governance by taking on tasks to which
other persons or bodies are better suited.”42 On the facts of DoucetBoudreau, however, the majority judges considered that the remedial
orders made by the trial judge, including the progress reports, were
well-within judicial competence:
The order in this case was in no way inconsistent with the judicial
function. There was never any suggestion in this case that the court
would, for example, improperly take over the detailed management
and co-ordination of the construction projects. Hearing evidence and
supervising cross-examinations on progress reports about the construction of schools are not beyond the normal capacities of courts.43

4. Assessing Whether a Remedy is “Appropriate and Just in the
Circumstances”
The majority judges were not prepared to read limits into the broad
wording of section 24(1) on the basis of concepts like judicial restraint
and separation of powers, procedural principles like functus officio, or
remedial law developed in other, non-Charter, contexts.44 Instead, they

41
42
43
44

Id., at paras. 130-32.
Id., at para. 34.
Id., at para. 74.
Id., at paras. 53-54.
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set forth “broad considerations that judges should bear in mind when
evaluating the appropriateness and justice of a potential remedy”:45
The remedy must meaningfully vindicate “the rights and freedoms of
the claimants ... [taking into account] the nature of the right that has
been violated and the situation of the claimant.”46
The remedy must “employ means that are legitimate within the
framework of our constitutional democracy... [thus courts] must not …
depart unduly or unnecessarily from their role of adjudicating disputes
and granting remedies that address the matter of those disputes.”47
The remedy must be “judicial ... invoking the function and powers of a
court ... inferred, in part, from the tasks with which [courts] are
normally charged and for which they have developed procedures and
precedent.”48
The remedy should be “fair to the party against whom the order is
made... and not impose substantial hardships that are unrelated to
securing the right.”49

The majority judges emphasized that “the judicial approach to remedies must remain flexible and responsive” and that section 24(1) should
be allowed to evolve, free of the restrictions of traditional and historical
remedial practice.50
5. The Majority Judges’ Application of the Remedial Factors in
this Case
The majority judges applied the four factors for assessing whether a
remedy is appropriate and just in the circumstances, and affirmed the
trial judge’s order requiring the province to report on progress in complying with the terms of the remedy.

45
46
47
48
49
50

Id., at para. 54.
Id., at para. 55.
Id., at para. 56.
Id., at para. 57.
Id., at para. 58.
Id., at para. 59.
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First, the majority concluded that the reporting order vindicated undisputed minority language education rights by providing an expedited
procedure for identifying problems with timely implementation of the
rights in the context of a history of delay and serious rates of assimilation of those who speak French.
Second, the majority held that the reporting order was consistent
with the role of the courts in Canada’s constitutional order, and appropriately utilized the court’s jurisdiction not only to declare constitutional
rights but to enforce them with injunctions against the executive.51
Third, the majority determined that the reporting order was appropriately judicial in nature, utilizing “functions and powers known to
courts.”52 The majority judges provided examples, from non-Charter
litigation, of courts exercising “active and even managerial roles in the
exercise of their traditional equitable powers”:53 in bankruptcy and receivership matters, in trusts and estates, and in family law. Thus, for
example, in bankruptcy and receivership matters, the presiding judge
supervised the company’s operations during its restructuring process.
While some have questioned the overall workability of the current creditor-protection legislative scheme, others note that a presiding bankruptcy judge has a wide-range of remedial powers.54 To illustrate, during
Air Canada’s current restructuring, James Farley J. has: 1) ordered parties to negotiate,55 2) determined who can bid for Air Canada’s Aeroplan,56 3) appointed a facilitator to assist during the ordered negotiations
between various unions and Air Canada management57 and 4) decided
which bid would be accepted to purchase a stake in Air Canada.58 The
remedial actions demonstrate the extent to which a judge may be required to undertake a supervisory, and even a managerial, role in legal
processes unrelated to constitutional litigation. In these instances the
51

Id., at para. 70.
Id., at para. 71.
53
Id., at para. 71, quoting Roach, Constitutional Remedies in Canada (looseleaf), at
para. 13.60.
54
Susan Pigg, “Law’s flaws threaten airline” Toronto Star (April 22, 2003) D1.
55
Susan Pigg & Rick Westhead, “Airline in holding pattern” Toronto Star (April 23,
2003) E1.
56
Susan Pigg, “Judge opens bidding for Aeroplan deal” Toronto Star (May 2, 2003) E1.
57
Susan Pigg, “5 unions, Air Canada ordered into talks” Toronto Star (May 10, 2003)
C1.
58
Rick Westhead, “Bid expected for Air Canada” Toronto Star (December 9, 2003) D1.
52
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judicial supervisory powers are being exercised within the private,
rather than the public, sector, but they do establish precedents to rebut
the argument that the supervisory role is beyond the experience and
competence of courts.
In Doucet-Boudreau, the majority judges concluded that requiring
government to report on its progress in complying with the court’s order
was consistent with the judicial function, and with the normal capacities
of courts to hear evidence and supervise cross-examinations. They specifically noted that the court did not “improperly take over the detailed
management and co-ordination of the construction projects.”59
As the American experience demonstrates, there could presumably
be circumstances, far beyond the facts of this case, in which a court,
facing a recalcitrant government institution, might be required to engage
in detailed supervision of institutional processes in order to enforce
compliance with Charter norms. It still seems unlikely that Canadian
governments will refuse or fail to comply with court orders declaring
constitutional rights. The continuation of the tradition of respect and
compliance will depend on the public’s perception of the legitimacy of
judicial review, its support for judicial elaborations of constitutional
guarantees,60 and the extent to which the costs of constitutional compliance compete for and claim priority in the allocation of scarce public
resources. Even though Canadian courts could become involved in detailed supervision of non-complying government programs, there was
no risk of such involvement in the Doucet-Boudreau case.
Fourth, the majority determined that the reporting order was sufficiently fair to the respondent government, in that it was not overly
vague, incomprehensible, or impossible to follow. The majority acknowledged that the order could have been more explicit and detailed,
and that there were alternatives to a reporting order that a trial judge
might consider, but they concluded that the reporting order was within
the range of appropriate remedies open to the trial judge in his exercise
of discretion.

59

Doucet-Boudreau, supra, note 1, at para. 74.
A changing attitude on the part of government may be perceived in the title of the
Ontario statute amending the Family Law Act in response to the Supreme Court of Canada
decision in M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, [1999] S.C.J. No. 23: Amendment Because of the
Supreme Court of Canada Decision in M. v. H. Act, S.O. 1999, c. 6.
60
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Accordingly, the majority judges concluded that the reporting order
was an appropriate and just remedy in all the circumstances.
6. Standard of Appellate Review of Remedial Orders Under
Section 24(1)
The majority judges emphasized that a superior court judge has a
wide and unfettered discretion under section 24(1) to design the remedy
that is appropriate and just in the circumstances, and that the exercise of
that discretion should be treated with deference by appellate courts.
They affirm that “[t]he trial judge is not required to identify the single
best remedy, even if that were possible.”61 They did suggest an alternative approach to remedies in situations of this kind: “[i]t may be more
helpful in some cases for the trial judge to seek submissions on whether
to specify a timetable with a right of the government to seek variation
where just and appropriate to do so,”62 but they confirmed that the trial
judge’s remedy was “clearly appropriate and just in the circumstances.”63
The dissenters agreed that deference was the appropriate standard of
appellate review as to remedy, but asserted that deference does not apply where “fundamental legal principles are threatened.”64 In their view,
respect for the executive branch of government requires that supervisory
orders be made only where government has failed or refused to comply
with prior judicial orders rendered in the same matter. In the dissenters’
view, the failure of the province to give effect to well-defined minority
language education rights, in circumstances where time was of the essence and delay would undermine entitlement to the rights, was insufficient to warrant the supervisory role of the Court. The dissenters would
thus encourage those whose rights are delayed to resort to litigation
early, building a record of their constitutional claims and of government
non-compliance, not only in public forums but also in the courts. Strategic decisions to pursue public lobbying rather than resort to litigation
early in the process could delay entitlement to an effective judicial
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remedy. The majority properly rejected this approach in favour of a
broader assessment of the manner in which government has sought to
fulfill, or avoid, its clearly defined constitutional obligations. Resort to
litigation, with its attendant costs to private individuals and organizations, may properly be a last resort after other avenues of persuasion
have been pursued, but recalcitrance in the face of a prior court order is
not a condition precedent to a supervisory remedy. Accordingly, the
majority declined to fetter the broad remedial discretion of the trial
judge or to substitute what it might consider to be a more appropriate
process for administering a constitutional remedy.
Since the dissenting judges considered that the trial judge’s reporting order failed to respect fundamental principles, they would have been
prepared to displace his discretion with their preferred disposition. In
their view, the trial judge should have issued a final order, with no reporting requirement, on the assumption that government would comply.
In the event of non-compliance, it would then be open to the claimants
to seek an order of contempt.
The majority judges rejected this alternative as being less appropriate, in the circumstances, than the reporting order in that it requires
initiating a new proceeding, on the basis of new material, before a new
judge, with significant attendant delay and cost. Even if the proposed
remedy were an appropriate and just alternative, it should not, in the majority’s view, displace the proper exercise of the trial judge’s discretion.

III. LEARNING FROM AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
WITH SUPERVISORY REMEDIES
Neither the majority judges nor the dissenting judges referred to the
experience of American courts with supervisory remedies for constitutional violations. The most far-reaching and intrusive of these remedies
in terms of impact on governmental or institutional action is the structural injunction, in which a court requires an institution to implement an
action plan to ensure future compliance with constitutional norms.65 The
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remedy is extraordinary and intrusive, and is ordered only where an
institution remains in violation of a previous ruling on constitutional
rights. The court may require the institution to file periodic progress
reports, and may appoint a special master under Rule 53 of the U.S.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure66 with responsibility to formulate an
appropriate action plan, and, if necessary, to oversee its implementation.
In the face of institutional intransigence, the presiding federal judge may
take direct jurisdiction over the management of the institution. The
supervisory jurisdiction continues until the institution demonstrates that
it has reached full compliance with the remedial order or that, on the
basis of its continual good faith compliance, it will reach full compliance.
Federal judges in the United States have decreed and supervised
structural injunctions to remedy segregation in schools and the failure to
comply with minimum constitutional standards in prisons and mental
hospitals. In these instances, resistance to constitutional rights leaves the
court with only two options: abandon the constitutional right or enforce
it by modifying institutional norms and practices. The dissenting judges
in Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia are right to emphasize the importance in Canada of the well-established tradition that governments respect and comply with decisions of the court on matters of constitutional
law. On the other hand, as both majority and dissenting judges recognized, extraordinary circumstances may warrant extraordinary remedies.
One extraordinary circumstance that may warrant the remedy of judicial supervision is the resolution of Native land claims. Land claims
can involve protracted periods of litigation and inordinate expenses for
all parties. However, a judicially supervised process where a judge retains jurisdiction to resolve impasses between the parties over the specific applications of generally defined rights might assist in expediting
the process. In Delgamuukw v. British Columbia,67 both parties sought a
remedy whereby the Court of Appeal would retain jurisdiction for two
years in order to enable the parties to negotiate.68 The Court of Appeal
refused to grant the remedy, holding that “the role of the Court of Appeal
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is not one of tailoring its judgment so as to facilitate settlement.”69 In the
Supreme Court of Canada, Lamer C.J. agreed that a court of appeal
must make legal declarations based on the trial record.70 The Court
ordered a new trial, but encouraged the parties to negotiate rather than
proceed with litigation. Chief Justice Lamer concluded that:
Ultimately, it is through negotiated settlements, with good faith and
give and take on all sides, reinforced by the judgments of this Court,
that we will achieve what I stated in Van der Peet, supra … to be a
basic purpose of s. 35(1) – “the reconciliation of the pre-existence of
aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of the Crown”. Let us face it,
we are all here to stay.71

A role for superior court judges in supervising Native land claims
negotiations could help to expedite the process, provided that it can be
managed in such a way as to protect any rights of appeal from judicial
determinations. The potential advantages of judicial supervision of aboriginal claims are reinforced by the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision
in R. v. Powley.72 The Court approved the Ontario Court of Appeal’s
staying of its decision to allow for what the Court characterized as “foster[ing] cooperative solutions.”73 The Supreme Court approved a broad
framework of rights within which the parties could negotiate, without
providing for judicial supervision. The problem with this solution is
that, if one of the parties will not negotiate or negotiates in bad faith, the
other must commence a new court proceeding, leading to greater delay,
duplication, and expense. In Native claims, retaining jurisdiction and
providing for judicial supervision of negotiation between the parties
might constitute the more appropriate and just remedy.
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IV. THE RESPONSIBILITY OF PARLIAMENT AND THE LEGISLATURES
FOR REVISING JURISDICTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL SYSTEMS TO
IMPLEMENT SECTION 24(1)
The majority judges in Doucet-Boudreau properly concluded that
section 24(1) provides broad discretion to develop Charter remedies that
are responsive and effective in vindicating Charter rights. The broad and
flexible remedial jurisdiction, may require “novel and creative features”
unrestricted by “traditional and historical remedial practice” which
“cannot be barriers to what reasoned and compelling notions of appropriate and just remedies demand.”74 The confirmation that the remedies
available under section 24(1) will be determined on the basis of a purposive and broad interpretation is encouraging, but its promise is undermined by the fact that it is restricted to superior court judges. The
combined effect of legislative inaction and court acquiescence has limited the remedial role of statutory and inferior courts and tribunals and
thus undermines access to effective Charter remedies.
The majority judges concluded that “superior courts retain ‘constant, complete, and concurrent jurisdiction’ to issue remedies under
s. 24(1)”75 and that there are no fetters on their jurisdiction.76 Nonetheless, they accepted the explanation advanced in R. v. Mills77 that “s.
24(1) did not confer new jurisdiction on statutory and inferior tribunals
beyond that which was intended by the legislator as reflected in the
tribunal’s function and the practical limits imposed by its structure.”78 In
other words, access to remedies may be dependent on “traditional and
historical” systems of jurisdiction and procedure that were designed for
the adjudication of non-Charter issues and have not been reconsidered in
light of section 24(1) of the Charter.
Parliament and the legislatures have not reviewed their laws in relation to the jurisdiction and procedure of courts and tribunals to give
effect to the constitutional purpose set forth in section 24(1). By default,
only the superior courts of inherent jurisdiction have the capacity to
accept the full mandate of section 24(1). Even though the judges in
74
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majority79 and the judges in dissent80 agree that Charter rights and remedies cannot be limited by statute or by the common law, they continue to
approve the position advanced by McIntyre J. in Mills that “the Charter
was not intended to turn the Canadian legal system upside down. What
is required rather is that it be fitted into the existing scheme of Canadian
legal procedure.”81
Even if the intentions of the drafters of the Charter could be ascertained, it is well-established that the interpretation of a provision of the
Charter is not governed by original intentions but must give effect to the
purpose of the provision, generously construed.82 Where existing laws
do not comply with the constitution, purposively construed, they will be
of no force and effect.83 Why is it, then, that the remedies available for
Charter infringement vary depending upon the pre-existing jurisdiction
and procedure of the particular court or tribunal in the particular proceeding in which the issue arises?
Do existing jurisdictional and procedural systems, designed for nonconstitutional matters, provide an effective framework for remedying
constitutional wrongs? If not, what are courts and legislatures to do?
In its unanimous decision in Dunedin Construction,84 the Supreme
Court of Canada confirmed its intent to interpret section 24(1) of the
Charter to
achieve a broad, purposive interpretation that facilitates direct access
to appropriate and just Charter remedies..., while respecting the
structure and practice of the existing court system and the exclusive
role of Parliament and the legislatures in prescribing the jurisdiction of
courts and tribunals.85

The Court affirmed that “it remains the role of Parliament and the
legislatures, and not the judiciary, to assign jurisdiction to the various
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courts and tribunals comprising our legal system.”86 Nonetheless, since
most courts and tribunals were established prior to enactment of the
Charter, their enabling legislation does not address their jurisdiction to
award remedies for Charter infringements. Accordingly, courts must
determine whether the jurisdiction can be inferred. In Dunedin Construction, the Court adopted a “functional and structural” approach:
“[w]here the Charter’s enactment implicated a court or tribunal in new
constitutional issues, it should be presumed that the legislature intended
the court or tribunal to resolve these issues where it is suited to do so by
virtue of its function and structure.”87 Accordingly, a court or tribunal
may now have jurisdiction to award remedies under section 24(1) even
in the absence of express jurisdiction to award the type of remedy that is
sought. The Court will examine the enabling legislation, the history, and
accepted practice of the court or tribunal, and determine whether it has
“the tools necessary to fashion the remedy sought … in a just, fair and
consistent manner without impeding its ability to perform its intended
function.”88 The Court has thus signalled its willingness to determine the
jurisdiction of courts and tribunals to award Charter remedies on a caseby-case basis, subject to explicit legislative intention.
In at least one other instance where a procedural system was found
to be inadequate, the Court declined to redesign it through the vehicle of
case-by-case analysis, and called on legislatures to step up to the plate.
Thus, in General Motors of Canada Ltd. v. Naken89 the Supreme Court
of Canada declined to approve a class action, and identified “the need
for a comprehensive legislative scheme for the institution and conduct
of class actions.”90 Some legislatures eventually responded, leading to
the enactment of class action legislation,91 which has enabled the use of
class actions. It thus remains puzzling that the Supreme Court of Canada
accepts as inevitable that existing jurisdictional and procedural frameworks must be utilized in Charter litigation whether or not they are
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appropriate to the determination of constitutional claims, and refrains
from calling on Parliament and the legislatures to address the issues in a
manner that will facilitate effective remedies for constitutional infringements. The Court’s willingness to infer remedial jurisdiction on
the basis of the tribunal’s function and structure opens up remedial potential, but generates uncertainty, requires expensive litigation on jurisdictional issues, and will be ineffective in the face of express statutory
provisions or in the absence of appropriate “tools” or procedures. The
Court’s conservative approach to remedies, as I have argued elsewhere,92 is unsatisfactory in that:
1) It may limit inferior courts and tribunals to awarding the most appropriate and just of the remedies that happen to be available in the
particular court or tribunal through the procedure utilized to initiate
the proceeding, and thus may defeat the purpose of section 24(1).
2) To obtain an effective remedy, it may be necessary to launch a multiplicity of proceedings with the attendant duplication and expense
and the possibility of inconsistent results.
3) Courts and tribunals may try to fit constitutional wrongs within
traditional remedies rather than fashioning remedies appropriate to
redress constitutional wrongs.
4) In effect, Charter remedies are subjected to legislative control.
Moreover, the control is divided in accordance with the division of
powers, with no encouragement to co-operative action between the
two levels of government93 to make available an appropriate array
of remedial procedures and powers, drawing on criminal and civil
jurisdiction.
In the absence of judicial encouragement, it is unlikely that Parliament and the legislatures will undertake a review of jurisdictional and
procedural requirements for the purpose of developing wider accessibility
to more effective Charter remedies against governments. The expansive
92
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and flexible approach demonstrated by the majority judges in DoucetBoudreau in addressing the remedial powers of superior court judges
should also be reflected in the design of jurisdictional and procedural
systems that equip other courts and tribunals to provide appropriate and
just remedies for Charter infringements.

V. CONCLUSION
In Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia, the majority judges addressed
the need to ensure that there is at least one forum, the superior court, in
which a claimant has access to a full range of Charter remedies, established and novel, from which the judge can tailor the remedy that is
most appropriate and just in the circumstances. The challenge, now, is
twofold: first, to hold the ground against those who urge judicial restraint in remedying unjustified infringements of guaranteed constitutional rights, and, second, to expand the application of section 24(1)
beyond the superior courts to those courts and tribunals with jurisdiction
to determine constitutional issues.

